Vanstraelen, A. (2003). Going-concern opinions, auditor switching, and the self-fulfilling prophecy effect examined in the regulatory context of Previous studies have demonstrated that auditors are reluctant to issue going-concern opinions. Some suggest this reluctance is strategic and stems from the auditor's desire to avoid loss of clients or reputation. This paper investigates the threat of loss re.sulting from auditor switching and client bankruptcy in the regulatory context of Belgium. Belgium requires companies to engage an audit firm for a three-year period. Consequently, the client's threat of .switching auditors is potentially more credible in the third year than in the first two years.
Introduction
The auditing literature documents the reluctance by auditors to issue goingconcern opinions (Hopwood et al. [1991] ; Citron and Taffler [1992] ; Carcello et al. [1997] ). As a possible explanation for the reluctance, research cites strategic auditor or client behavior (Krishnan and Krishnan 11996] ; Matsumuraet al. 11997]). Essentially, the auditor faces an economic trade-off in deciding to issue a goingconcern opinion. On the one hand, auditors not issuing a going-concern opinion *Universileil Anlwerpen and Universiteii Maa.stricht I wish to thank Ihe members of my dcKioral commission for iheir comments on earlier versions of this paper, in particular Ann JoHssen, Willein Buijink. John Christcnsen. and Ignace De Beelde. The helpful suggestions of the participants of the EAA conrercnce in Munich 200(). my colleagues at the LIniversiteit Maastricht. Nico Valckx, and two anonymous referees are also gratefully acknowledged. A special word of gratitude is due to Peter Joos and Steven MaijtKir. face costs of exposure to third-party lawsuits and loss of reputation (Krishnan and Krishnan 11996] ). On the other hand, auditors issuing a going-concern opinion face costs of loss of clients and/or loss of reputation (Teoh |I992] ; Nogler [1995|) . Empirical studies examining the costs of audit loss are limited, especially in the context of Continental European countries. In my study. I examine the relation between going-concern opinions and audit loss in a Continental European business environment, Belgium.
Audit loss can occur when the client switches auditors after Ihe client company survives the going-concern opinion, or when the client goes bankrupt. My paper contributes to the literature by examining empirically the impact of a going-concern opinion both on auditor switching and client bankruptcy and in the regulatory context of Belgium. Being a Continental European country. Belgium exhibits business environment characteristics different from those found in Anglo-American countries. First, accounting is governed by a legal framework, banks and other financial institutions play a central role in corporate financing, and tinancial reporting is strongly influenced by tax considerations and is creditor-oriented (Lefebvre and Flower |1994]; BI(x:k and Jorissen [1995] ). Second, litigation rates in Continental Europe are rather low in comparison with the United States and the United Kingdom (Kinney [1994] ; Gietzmann and Quick [1998] ). Third, in contrast to many countries, Belgium exhibits the additional characteristic of an audit mandate of three years, renewable without limitation, but always for a period of three years. Tbe renewable audit mandate of three years in Belgium allows me to examine whether the decision to issue a going-concern opinion early--versus later during the mandate-affects auditor switching differently.
I find results consistent with the hypothesis that a going-concern opinion significantly increases the likelihood of impending bankruptcy. In addition. I find companies surviving a going-concern opinion are significantly more likely to switch auditors in the subsequent year. I also find the effect of a going-concern opinion on auditor switching only exists when the auditor issues the going-concern opinion in the last year of the official mandate; a going-concern opinion in the first two years of the official mandate does not appear to incrementally explain auditor switching. My results, therefore, suggest mandatory tcniis influence the association between going-concern opinions and auditor switching and potentially affect auditor independence.
My study contributes to the auditing literature by providing evidence on the contentious issue of the self-fulfilling prophecy effect, which comes down to the belief that a client will go bankrupt as a result of a going-concern opinion. In addition, the results reveal the mitigating role mandatory terms can play in dampening clients" threats to switch auditors when they are dissatisfied with the auditor's report.
This paper is organized as follows. First. I review the relevant previous literature. Second. I describe the audit market in Belgium that provides an institutional framework for interpreting the empirical results of the study. Third, I formulate the hypotheses. Fourth, I describe the research design. Fifth, I present the results of the study. Finally, I discuss the results, draw conclusions, address the limitations of the study, and give suggestions for further research. ' 2, Previous Literature A going-concern opinion can trigger the end of an auditor-client relationship. Audit loss subsequent to the issuance of a going-concern opinion can result from client bankruptcy or auditor switching.
Self-Fulfilling Prophecy Effect
The belief that a client will go bankrupt as a result of a going-concern opinion is known in the literature as the self-fulfilling prophecy effect (Mutchler 11984] ). Mutchler reports, on the basis of interviews, that auditors admit that they take the potential impact of a going-concern opinion on the client into account. However, the majority of partners interviewed do not believe in the self-fulfilling prophecy effect. According to Boritz (1991) . the self-fulfilling prophecy effect is a "myth."
The game-theoretic model of Tucker and Matsumura (1998) predicts auditors issue fewer going-concern opinions when such opinions are self-fulfilling. However, the experimental results do not confirm the economic prediction. A possible explanation is that auditors exhibit risk aversion and attetTipt to avoid negative payoffs resulting from reporting errors.
Empirical research on the existence of the self fulfilling prophecy effect finds conflicting results. No supportive evidence is found by Citron and Taffler (1992) , Louwers et al. (1999) , or Citron and Taffler (2001) . In contrast, evidence consistent with the self-fulfilling prophecy effect is provided by George et al. (1996) and Pryor and Terza (2(X)1). Given the mixed results of prior empirical research, further research on the self-fulfilling prophecy effect is warranted. Louwers et al. (1999) sum up some key technical problems of examining the self-fulfilling prophecy effect: First, it is difficult to disentangle a going-concern opinion from other indicators of financial distress. Second, evidence that goingconcern opinions are significant in predicting bankruptcy could arise because the opinion is a self-fulfilling prophecy or because the auditor possesses private information that is subsumed in the going-coticern opinion and correctly anticipates bankruptcy. Third, archival data limit the possibility to fully assess the impact of a going-concern opinion on a company's future opctations. Indeed, it is impossible to apply dissimilar treatments to similar companies, nor is it possible to observe whether a bankrupt company would still be in existence had the auditor decided against issuing a going concern opinion. This paper addresses the first two limitations in the following way. First, in contrast to the study of Louwers et al. (1999) , my study includes companies that either did or did not receive a going-concern opinion. Moreover, other indicators of financial distress besides the going-concern opinion variable are included in the bankruptcy-prediction model. This allows me to examine whether a going-concern JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING, AUDITING & RNANCE opinion incrementally explains bankruptcy, while controlling for other indicators of financial distress. Second. 1 test for a correlation between unobserved bankruptcy determinants and the going-concern opinion variable. The test consists of computing the generalized residuals of the going-concern opinion variable and including them as an additional explanatory variable in the bankruptcy model.
Auditor Switching
Early empirical research uses open-ended questionnaires to infer companies' reasons for auditor switching. The following reasons are often cited: audit fee. responsiveness of the auditor to the client, merger and acquisition, rotation policy, occurrence of management changes, lack of a good working relationship, reporting disagreements, and financial distress (Fried and Schiff II98I1: DeAngelo 119821; Eichenseher and Shields [1983] ; Menon and Schwartz 11985] : Addams and Davis [1994] : Schwartz and Soo 11996] ).
Empirical research further examines the association between either client or auditor characteristics and observed auditor selection, or changes in these characteristics and observed auditor changes (Beattie and Fearnley [ 19951) . Research findings show that the likelihood of auditor switching is negatively related to the length of the auditor-client relation.ship (Levintha! and Fichman [1988] ), and positively related to initial public offerings (Menon and Williams Ii99l|) . agency conflicts (DeFond [1992] ). and changes in client size (Haskins and Williams [1990] ).
The receipt of a qualified opinion appears to Increase the likelihood of auditor switching (Chow and Rice [1982] ; Craswell 11988]; Citron and Taffler 11992]; Krishnan and Stephens [1995] ; Lennox [2(X)0]), although this finding is not supported by Menon and Schwartz (1985) . Auditor conservatism, resulting in a tendency to issue qualilied reports, motivates auditor changes as well (Krishnan [1994] ; DeFond and Subramanyam 11998]). The experimental results of Tucker and Matsumura (1998) suggest clients switch more often if the auditor's goingconcern opinion increases the prospect of business termination. Krishnan et al. (1996) find that companies with high switch threats are more likely to receive modified reports. Lennox (2000) provides evidence that auditor switching increases the likelihood of a change in audit report.
In sum. prior research examining the relationship between auditor reporting and auditor switching has tested different influences on audit reporting. This paper examines the association between going-concern opinions and auditor switching in Belgium where audit firms are engaged for three-year periods. I expect that the client's threat of switching auditors is more credible in the third year relative to the first two years.
The Audit lMarket in Belgium
Belgian Company Law governs the statutory audit of companies. The General Meeting of Shareholders appoints the statutory auditor on the recommendation of the Board of Directors. All Belgian companies Ihat employ on average more than one hundred workers have a v^'orks' council. It is a body with parity representation of employers and employees and it.s purpose is to implement social legislation. The works' council has the right to refuse the appointment of the nominee auditor and defend this position in eourt. Auditors are appointed for a term of three years that is renewable without limitation for further three-year periods. Dismissal of the auditor during his mandate is only allowed under exceptional circumstances {e.g. physical incapacity or negligence resulting in a loss of confidence). Likewise, resignation of the auditor during his mandate is restricted, except for serious personal reasons. The General Meeting has to be informed in writing of the reasons for the resignation, and the resignation has to be approved by the works" council, if established, and for companies under prudential control by the supervisory organ.'
In principle, the audit fee remains fixed during the mandate of three years. However, the General Meeting of Shareholders is allowed to stipulate an index fee adjustment. Bree.sch (2(H)I) provides evidence that audit mandates in Belgium are frequently renewed. Her results suggest the average audit tenure is twenty years and the resignation rate of Belgian auditors is low.
Auditors in Belgium are subject to a strict code of ethics and auditing standards. Many of the regulations aim to protect auditor independence (Buijink et al. 11996] ). Belgium has a proportional liability system. The client company, shareholders, and interested third parties can undertake legal action against the auditor until five years after the issue of the auditor's report. Litigation rates in Belgium are low. as is typical for countries that have government-prescribed conservative accounting standards, and where the major providers of capital are banks or the government (Mueller et al. |I994] ).
Belgian audit regulation requires the auditor to ascertain whether the goingconcem assumption is acceptable and to what extent existing going-concern problems are adequately disclosed in the financial statements. Depending on the situation. Belgian audit regulation requires the following types of audit reports: an unqualified report with explanatory paragraph when the going-concern uncertainty has been correctly disclosed in the financial statements'; a qualified opinion in case of inappropriate information in the financial statements; a disclaimer of opinion in case of lack of information to evaluate the going-concern status ofthe company; and an adverse opinion if the going-concern assumption is no longer appropriate.
1. Banks and insurance companies are under the prudeniial control of the Financial Supervisory Board. This means thai ihese companies are submitted to .stricter audil regulations. One of the ia.sks of the Financial Supervisory Board consi.sls ot" the appoinimeni and approval of resignaiion of the statutory auditor.
2. During the period under study. 1992-1996. the "unqualitied audit opinion with explanatory paragraph" was not yet recognized by ihe Belgian In.slitute of Auditors. However. 4 out of tiie 1.176 companies in our .sample did receive an unqualilied opinion that mentions going-concem problems. These four reports are coded as disclosing a going-concem uncenainiy.
Development of Hypotheses
This paper examines whether auditors in Belgium suffer economic loss as a result of issuing going-concern opinions. Audit loss can result from client bankruptcy or auditor switching. In this respect, I test two hypotheses.
Auditors defend their reluctance to issue a going-concern opinion because they fear the self-fulfilling prophecy effect. In the words of P. Behets, former chairman of the Belgian Institute of Auditors: "Every warning could mean the end of the company und damage all interested parties. When the management of the company with going-concern problems does not seem to undertake any actions to restore their financial position, the auditor's decision to issue a going-concern opinion becomes even more sensitive" (De Fimtncieel Economische Tijd [1996] ). The first hypothesis deals with the impact of a going-concern opinion on the likelihood of client bankruptcy. The hypothesis formulated in altemative form is as follows:
H,\ Going-concern opinions increase the likelihood of bankruptcy, controlling for factors that simultaneously influence the likelihood of bankruptcy and the likelihood of a going-concern opinion. The second hypothesis deals with the impact of a going-concern opinion on the probability of auditor switching when the client .survives. Since auditors in Belgium are appointed for a minimum and renewable period of three years, I examine whether the impact of a going-concern opinion in the audit report issued in the first two years of the audit mandate differs from one issued in the last year of the audit mandate. The hypothesis formulated in alternative form is as follows:
H^: Going-concern opinions increase the likelihood of auditor switching more in the last year of the audit mandate than in the first two years.
Research Design

Sample
The empirical analysis uses data over the period 1992-19% taken from CD-ROMs of the Belgian National Bank. The CD-ROMs contain the annual accounts of all Belgian companies that have to publish their financial statements (in general, all limited liability companies). For each year, three samples are selected. The first sample is from the population of large companies that went bankrupt.' The bankrupt sample does not contain financial institution.s, utility companies, or listed firms."
The second sample contains financially stressed, non-bankrupt, large companies. Based on common criteria in the literature (Kida |I98Q]; Mutchler [1985J; Hopwood et al. 11994] ), I consider a company as financially stressed if it either has a loss from operations, a bottom line loss, negative retained earnings, or a quick ratio smaller than one in the previous two years. The third sample is a control sample and contains financially non-stressed, non-bankrupt, large companies. Menon and Schwartz (1985) stress the importance of matching control groups by year, industry, and size. Therefore, the three samples are matched by year, industry (using NACE codification, 4 digits^), and size (based on total assets). The sample design of this study is similar to the U.K. study of Citron and Taffler (1992) ."
The three samples contain 392 observations each or, in total, 1,176 observations. The financiai statements, the audit report, and the annual report of the Board of Directors are collected and examined for each company in the sample. Table I illustrates the sample proportions and the type of audit report issued. The table shows that only 37 percent of bankrupt companies receive a going-concern opinion in the audit report one year prior to bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy Model
To analyze the impact of a going-concem opinion on the probability of company failure, 1 distinguish between initial and repeated going-concern opinions. It could be argued that it is unreasonable to interpret the occurrence of bankruptcy after several years of repeated going-concern opinions as a self-fulfilling prophecy (Pryor and Terza [20011) . However, if repealed going-concern opinions have no effect on the probability of bankruptcy, this would weaken the claim that auditors suffer losses as a result of issuing going-concem opinions. I identify companies with repeated going-concern opinions by examining the three previous audit reports of all companies that receive a going-concem opinion.
To estimate the likelihood of bankruptcy after receipt of an initial goingconcern opinion (IGCO) and a repeated going-concem opinion (RGCO). I use logistic regression analysis. An initial and repeated going-concem opinion are the two main variables of interest in the bankruptcy model. To control for the fact that company failure could also have been predicted based on publicly available financial and non-financial information, I include the following control variables in the model.
First, I include the financial condition of the firm as a control variable. I measure the financial condition by the general discriminant score (DSCORE) of a 5. NACE is the abbreviiition of "Nomenctaturi; Gencrale des Activiles Economiqucs dans I' Union Europ^enne" or "General Name for Economic Activities In the European Union." The NACE-code system is based on lhe European standard for indusiry ckissilications.
6. The sample design is different from similar research in lhe United States where matched-pairs sampling often is used: a sample with unqualilied opinions and a sample with modified opinions. This .sampling approach is nol possible in Belgium since Belgian databases do not allow to search directly on the type of audit report issued. Standard bankruptcy prediction model developed for Belgian companies.' I expect that a lower DSCORE results in a higher likelihood of bankruptcy. Second. I include the time lag between the closing of the fiscal year and the submission of the financial statements to the Belgian National Bank as a control variable. In this respect, I make a distinction between a delay of the annual general meeting of shareholders (GMDELAY) and a submi.ssion lag (SUBMLAG) of the financial statements to the Belgian National Bank. Belgian Company Law requires that the annual general meeting take place within six months after the closing of the fi.scal year. Companies have to submit the financial .statements to the Belgian National Bank within thirty days after the annual general meeting of shareholders. I expect that problem companies delay their annual general meeting and exceed the required submission time of the financial statements and consequently are more likely to go bankrupt.
Third. 1 include the location of the company (LOC) as a control variable: Flanders or Wallonia. National statistics show the bankruptcy ratio, that is. the number of bankruptcies divided by the number of establishments, is higher in the southern part of Belgium-Wai Ionia-compared to the northern part-Flanders. The same applies to the number of bankruptcies divided by the total number of 7. The DSCORE is calculated from Ihe general multiple linear discriminant model, developed for Belgian companies, consisting of Ihe following ratios: accumulated profit (loss) and reserves/total Hahilitics; taxes and social security charges/short-term external liabilities; cash/reslHcted current assct.s; work in progres.s and finished goods/restricted current a.ssets; short-iemi financial Uebts/shon-lcmi external liabilities. The optimal cul-off ptiini of DSCORE=0.13()4 (Ooghc. Joos. and de Bourdeaudhuij [1995] ). The bankruptcy models developed in Belgium do not make a distinction between industries (Ooghe ct al. il995|). It would be beyond Ihe scope of this paper to develop different bankruptcy models for different industries.
companies.** Therefore, the probability of bankruptcy of a cotnpany located in Wallonia i.s higher than the probability of bankruptcy in Flanders. An economic explanation for this higher bankruptcy ratio is the structure of the economy in Wallonia, which is characterized by traditional industries and a weaker demand, resulting in lower economic growth rate.
Finally, 1 include bad news disclosed in the annual report of the Board of Directors as a control variable. Belgian Company Law prescribes the type of infortnation the annual report of the Board of Directors must contain. Two statutory paragraphs are of particular importance for assessing the likelihood of failure, namely paragraph 2 "important events after the closing of the fiscal year" (PAR2) and paragraph 3 "circumstances that can influence significantly the development of the company" (PAR3). Next to these two paragraphs. Belgian Company Law requires the annual report to di.sclose if Article 103/104 of Belgian Cotiipany Law (ARTI03/104) that signals financial distress is applicable.'' Finally, the annual report can provide additional information (ADINFO) besides that required by law. I distinguish three types of news eletnents that could be relevant for the prediction of bankruptcy: general information on the economic situation, a description of the prospects of the company, and a description of actions and/or measures that will be taken. I expect that bad news in the second and third statutory paragraphs, disclosure that Article 103/104 is applicable, and voluntary disclosure of additional bad news increases the likelihood of company failure. Table 2 summarizes and defines the variables used in the bankruptcy model.
Using logistic regression, I estimate the following bankruptcy model:
BANKRUPT, = Po + P, IGCO, + p, RGCO, + P, DSCORE, + p, GMDELAY, + p., SUBMLAG, + P, LOC, (i) + P, PAR2, + P, PAR3i + Py ADINFO, Maddala (1991) argues that using a choice-based sample to estimate a logit model requires no weighting procedure. The coefficients of the explanatory variables are not affected by the unequal sampling rates, it is only the constant term that is affected. 8. The bankruptcy raiio. defined as ihe number of bankruptcies divided by the number of cstahlishnient.s, is in Wallonia on average 0.28 and in Flandens 0.22 during the period 1991-1996. The number of bankruptcies divided by the tdttil number of companies follow.s the same pattern, on average 0.020 In Wallonia and 0.017 in Flanders during the period 1991-1996 (calculations based on data provided by the NIS).
9. Article (103. Alarmprocedure) states: "If net assets are less than 50% of the subscribed capital. the Board of Directors is required to convene the members of the general meeting, who must decide on the basis of the Board's reurgani.sation plans whether or not to continue the entity. The diagnosis has to take into account the specific characteristics of the entity at the closing date of the fiscal year. as well as events between tliis closing date and the date on which the Board of Directors approves the annual staiements and submits them to the general meeting." Article (104) states that "if net assets are below the minimal amount any interested party may appeal to the court to dissolve the company." 
Iniiial going concern opinion to client i in year t-l RGCO,:
Repeated going-concern opinion to chent i in year t-l DSCORE,:
Discriminant Ordinal variable: ADINFO| = 0 in case no additional bad news or good news is disclosed; AD-INFO,= 1. 2. or 3 in case bud news is disclosed on one, two, ihree information elemenis. respectively.
In case of a mixture of good and bad news elements, only the bad news elements count for ctKJing the ADINFO,>0. Binary variable; ART1O3/1O4,= I in case the application of the Ariicle(s) is disclosed, else ART 103/104=0
Switching Model
For the second research hypothesis, the sample of bankt^pt companies cannot be used since Ihc decision to switch auditors is no longer relevant. Therefore, the analyses are done on tbe samples of financially stressed and nun-strcsscd surviving companies. Botb samples contain 392 observations eacb. so the total number of observations is 784. Data on tbe bistory and length of tbe auditor-client relationship are retrieved from the CD-ROMs of the Belgian National Bank. For eacb observation, tbe following information is collected: tbe start of tbe auditor-client reiationsbip; number of renewals of the audit mandate: and the end of tbe last audit mandate when tbe client switches auditors. Given the audit mandate of tbree years, audit firm switch data are analyzed over a period of three years following the audit report. For example, if tbe audit report of company X was issued in 1994 (year t), tben it is cbecked whetber company X switcbes auditors in 1995 (year t + 1), 1996 (year t + 2), or 1997 (year t + 3). In tolal. 9.31% (-73/784) of the companies switcb auditors. Table 3 summarizes and defines the dependent and independent variables.
The dependent binary variable is "SWITCH," coded I if a company switcbes auditors in tbe next mandate period (year t + I. year t + 2, or year t + 3, depending on wbetber the year of tbe examined audit report was respectively the last, second. or first year of tbe audit mandate) or coded 0 in tbe case of no switch. Tbe independent variables of interest are going-concern opinions in the first, second, or last year of tbe incumbent auditor's official mandate. A distinction is also made between initial and repeated going-concem opinions, since initial going-concern opinions may have a bigger impact on auditor switching. Tbis results in the following six variables: initial going-concem opinion in tbe first (IGCOYI). second (IGC0Y2), or final year (IGC0Y3) of the auditor's mandate and repeated going-concem opinion in the first (RGCOYl). second (RGC0Y2), or final year (RGCOY3).
To reduce the likelihood of correlated omitted variables, I include tbree control variables in the model that can affect the auditor switch decision.'" First, a switcb of auditor can reflect financial distress (Menon and Schwartz 11985|) . I measure financial distress by tbe general discriminant score (DSCORE) of a standard bankruptcy prediction model developed for Belgian companies.
Second, most auditor switching studies include an auditor size variable. Big 6 auditor or non-Big 6 auditor (B6) (Krisbnan [1994] Binary variable: IGC0Y3,= I in case of an initial going-concern opinion in the last year of the auditor's ofticial mandate, else 1GCOY3,=0 Third, auditor switching could be affected by client size. Some auditor switching studies find a negative relationship between auditor switching and size (Haskins and Williams [1990] ; Krishnan [1994] ). Smaller companies tend to move to large auditors as they grow and their needs change. For large companies, auditor switching is more costly (Williams 11988] ). Moreover, fewer audit firms exist that can handle large companies since they are often geographically dispersed and involve complex transactions. I measure client size by the natural logarithm of total assets (LNASSETS).
Using logistic regression analysis. I estimate the following auditor switching model; SWITCH, = Po + P, IGCOYl, + P, IGC0Y2i + P, IGC0Y3i + p4 RGCOYl, + % RGCOY2, 4-p,, RGC0Y3, (2) + p, DSCORE^ + p« Bt, + p.j LNASSETSi + e, 6. Results
Bankruptcy Model
The three samples (bankrupt; financially stressed, non-bankrupt; and financially non-stressed, non-bankrupt) contain 392 observations each, or in total 1.176 companies. Of these 1.176 companies. 198 companies (17%) receive a going-concern opinion. Of these 198 companies, only 53 (27%) survive the first year. The three previous audit reports of the 198 companies are examined to identify companies with initial going-concern opinion.s. Of these 198 companies, 76 companies (38.4%) receive a going-concern opinion for the first time. Of these 76 companies, only 27 companies (35.5%) survive the following year. Ofthe 122 companies with a repeated going-concem opinion, only 26 companies (21.3%) survive the subsequent year. Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of the control variables and Table 5 presents the Pearson correlation matrix. Table 4 .shows that, in comparison with non-bankrupt firms, companies one year prior to bankruptcy have significantly lower D-scores and significantly delay the annual general meetings and the submission of financial statements. Most companies are located in Flanders, but the presence of Walloon companies is significantly higher in the smnple of bankmpt companies. Finally, soon-to-be bankrupt firms disclose significantly more bad news in their annual reports.
The results of the bankruptcy model can only be used to assess the impact of a going-concem opinion on the probability of bankruptcy if the going-concem opinion variable is exogenous {Pryor and Terza |2{K)I|). Therefore, it is checked whether the going-concem opinion variables are correlated with the regression error term, resulting in biased regression estimates (Greene 120001) . To test for endogeneity bias, the following procedure is followed. First, I estimate the goingconcem opinion model to compute the generalized residuals of the going-concem . (Gourieroux et al. [1987] ).'''"' Subsequently, ! include these generalized residuals as an additional explanatory variable in the bankruptcy model. If the coefficient of the residuals is significant, the going-concern opinion variables are endogenou.s. In unreported results, I find the coefficient of the residual variable insignificant (p=().872), so the hyptithesis of no endogeneity bias cannot be rejected. Hence, the bankruptcy model can he used to assess the impact of a goingconcem opinion on the probability of bankruptcy.
As can be seen from Table 6 , the coefficients of both the initial and repeated going-concern opinion variables are significant (p<O.OI). This is consistent with the hypothesis that a going-concem opinion significantly increases the probability of bankmptcy. Table 6 further shows that the following variables significantly increase the likelihood of bankruptcy: bad financial condition, a delay ofthe annual general meeting of shareholders, a delay of the submission of the financial statements, location in an economically weaker region, important post year-end events, and additional bad news disclosed in the annual report of the Board of Directors."*
Switching Model
The samples of financially stressed, non-bankrupt and financially non-stressed, non-bankrupt companies contain 392 cases each or, in total, 784 companies, of which 73 companies (9.31%) switched auditors. Table 7 presents the results of the univariate analysis. The Pearson correlation matrix Is presented in Table 8 . Table 9 presents the logistic regression results.
The results of both the univariate and logistic regression analysis show auditor switching is related to the year of mandatory term in which a going-concem opinion is given. In particular, companies switch auditors significantly more when they have received an initial or repeated going-concern opinion in the last year of the auditor's official mandate. An initial or repeated going-concem opinion in the first or second year does not result in a higher likelihood of auditor switching."' This 13. The model for going-concern opinions is specitied wilh the rollowiiig independent variables: financial conditiiin. delay of [he annuai general meeting, submission lag ol" the annual aeL-oiint.s. localiun of the client company, auditor type, audilor switch, length of the auditor-client reiationship, year of auditor mandate, audit fee. recent client loss, and had news in the annual report of Ihe Board of Directors.
14. The generalized residuals are derived from the first order conditions that define the maximum likelihood estimates and are calctjlated as follows:
15. Company .size (measured by natural logarithm of total assets) has no significant multivariate effect on bankruptcy.
16. A univariate analysis of auditor's reporting behavior shows that auditors issue less initial though signilicantly more repeated going-concem opinions in the last year of their mandate as opposed to the first two years. When tested in a multivariate way. there are no significant differences in auditor reporting behavior beiween the three years of the mandate, either for an initial or for a repeated goingconcem opinion. = initial going concern opinion in second year of auditor's mandate IGC0Y3 = initial going-concern opinion in third year of auditor's mandate RGCOYI = repeated going-concem opinion in first year of audiior's mandate RGC0Y2 = repeated going-concem opinion in second year of auditor's mandate RGC0Y3 = repeated going concem opinion in third year of auditor's mandate B6 = Big 6 auditor (coded I) or a non-Big 6 auditor DSCORE = general discriminani score LNASSETS = natural logarithm of toial assets = initial going-concem opinion in lirst year of auditor's mandate IGCOY2 = initial going-concem opinion in second year of auditor's mandate IGC0Y3 = initial going-concem opinion in ihird year of auditor's mandate RGCOY 1 = repeated going-concem opinion in tirst year of audilor's mandate RGC0Y2 = repeated going-concem opinion in second year of auditor's mandate RGC0Y3 = repeated going-concem opinion in third year of auditor's mandate DSCORE = general discriminani score B6 = Big 6 auditor (ctuied I) or a non-Big 6 auditor LNASSETS = natural logarithm of total assets 7. Discussion and Conclnsions This paper investigates the impact of a going-concern opinion on audit loss resuhing from client bankruptcy or auditor switching. The results of the empirical analysis are consistent with the hypothesis that both initial and repeated goingconcern opinions increase the likelihood of impending bankruptcy. This finding suggests the audit report has informational value for the users of the financiai statements, even in a country where corporate financing is dominated by banks and other financial institutions."* 18. An altemative methixl for le,sting the infonnation content of audit opinions is an event study approach. Given the small number of Belgian companies that are listed and the fact thai no listed firm went banknipi in the period under study (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) . it was nol possible to examine the market reaction to going-concem disclosure announcements. This paper addresses key technical problems of examining the self-fulfilling prophecy effect but is subject to several caveats. Although 1 control for a correlation between unobserved bankruptcy determinants and going-concern opinions and I control for most publicly observable indicators of distress. I cannot eliminate the omitted variable problem (e.g., 1 do not control for press coverage). Moreover, it is not possible to determine what would have happened to firms that received going-concem opinions had they not received them. Nor is it possible to randomly select firms that will receive a going-concem opinion in a controlled environment (Citron and Taffler [1992] ).
My results provide further evidence that companies surviving a going-concem opinion are significantly more likely to switch auditors in the subsequent year. This finding is consistent with the results of Lennox (2000), In addition. 1 find that the effect of both initial and repeated going-concem opinions on auditor switching only occurs when going-concern opinions are given in the last year of official audit mandates. Indeed, clients are more than four times as likely to switch auditors at the end of the mandatory term if they receive a going-concern opinion in the final year, compared to any other year. This suggests the regulatory mandate of three years affects the way clients pressure auditors with a loss of future audit fees. A limitation of this study is that no distinction is made between auditor resignations and auditor dismissals, Belgian Company Law does not require companies to disclose the initiating party to an auditor change and in practice it is not disclosed. However, there is evidence that the resignation rate of auditors in Belgium is low (Breesch |2001|).
Finally, 1 analyze the impact of a going-concern opinion on the probability of bankruptcy and on the probability of audit(jr switching. Further research can investigate the impact of a going-concern opinion on other events (e.g., merger, voluntary liquidation) or on the auditor's reputation. The analysis of the economic effects and effectiveness of different national regulations on auditor independence presents another avenue of future research.
